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In Japan, a slowdown in economic growth has 
been observed for a few decades. One possible 
reason for this is the decline in the population 
growth rate. The Japanese economy is facing a 
declining birthrate. According to World Bank 
(2016), in Japan, the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) had 
declined from 2.16 in 1971 to 1.42 in 2014. The 
TFR has slightly recovered after hitting the lowest 
rate, 1.26 in 2005. However, this rate is too low 
to keep the present population size. What cause a 
declining birthrate? One possible reason is a high 
cost for child rearing. Child rearing requires a lot of 
time and education expenses. Indeed, the Japanese 
government has tackled this problem. For instance, 
from April in 2010 the Japanese government has 
begun to provide child allowances. In addition, 
the Japanese government allocates its budget to 
child care services, gives subsidy to kindergartens 
and nursery schools. At this time, however, these 
policies do not raise the birthrate rapidly. On the 
other hand, Sweden and France have succeeded 
in increasing the TFR. Sweden for example raised 
TFR from 1.5 in 1998 to 1.98 in 2010 by promoting 
a child-care leave system and childcare services. 
These measures provide good examples of child-
rearing policies for developed countries. Thus, we 
consider the following issues: Can these policies 
raise the fertility rate? How do these policies have 
an impact on economic growth?
Section 2 sets up the model used in this study. 
We introduce human capital accumulation in an 
overlapping generations model with R&D-driven 
expansion in variety of intermediate goods. We 
consider a three-period overlapping generations 
model a la Diamond (1965). An individual lives 
at most for three periods: childhood, adulthood, 
old age. In their childhood, individuals are reared 
by their parents and educated by teachers without 
making any decision. In their adulthood, individuals 
supply labor to the market, earn labor income, raise 
their children, and consume goods. In their old age, 
they only consume their saving and have no bequest 
motive. On the production side of the economy, we 
introduce the education market into the economy, 
which consists of three sectors; a final good sector, 
an intermediate sector, and an R&D sector as in 
Romer (1990) and Jones (1995).
Section 3 derives the equilibrium dynamics and 
the long-run growth rate of per capita GDP. In this 
model, the per capita GDP growth rate is positively 
correlated with population growth and the education 
level. Furthermore, we examine how a rise in life 
expectancy impacts the long-run per capita GDP 
growth rate. A rise in life expectancy negatively 
affects economic growth by lowering population 
growth rate.
Section 4 introduces child rearing policies 
and analyzes the influences of these policies on 
economic growth. The introduction of child rearing 
policies is based on Futagami and Konishi (2017). 
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Here, we consider an education subsidy and a child 
care service as child rearing policies. We show that 
an increase in an education subsidy always has 
negative effects on fertility and positive effects on 
education. Thus, we demonstrate that an education 
subsidy promotes economic growth by accelerating 
human capital accumulation when the level of the 
subsidy is not too high. On the contrary, too much 
education subsidy negatively affects the long-run 
growth rate by lowering fertility. 
This paper also shows that a rise in the child care 
service always decreases the amount of education. 
As for fertility, when the child care service is 
sufficiently low, it raises fertility. Too much child 
care service, however, lowers fertility. Therefore, we 
demonstrate that a child care service can promote 
economic growth by boosting fertility. In contrast, 
a child care service can negatively affect economic 
growth by not only decreasing education, but also 
lowering fertility when there exists too much child 
care service.
Section 5 examines how they affect the utility 
level in the long run. We demonstrated that 
there exists a certain level of each policy which 
maximizes the utility level of individuals in the 
long run. Furthermore, we showed that the level 
of the education subsidy which maximizes the 
long-run growth rate of per capita GDP is smaller 
than the level which maximizes the utility level of 
individuals in the distant future. On the other hand, 
the level of the child care service which maximizes 
the per capita GDP growth rate is larger than the 
level which maximizes the utility level.
In closing, we would like to suggest directions for 
future researches. First, we analyzed only the long-
run effects on the welfare levels. If we consider 
the short-run effects, it is possible to show that 
there exists an intergenerational conflict between 
current and future generations with respect to child 
rearing policies, as in Hashimoto and Tabata (2013). 
Second, following Futagami and Konishi (2017), we 
assume the government expenditure is financed by a 
lump-sum tax. It would be interesting, however, to 
consider the changes due to consumption or income 
taxes. Finally, we do not conduct calibration. These 
issues are left for future researches.
